This book, from the former foreign minister of Pakistan, conducted a calm analysis of the most sensitive areas of the world's extremist background, breathing fresh air in the vast literature on this subject. Without prejudice to or against Pakistan, this book is an exception to the usual ordinary literature produced by former Pakistani diplomats. Then, a calm analysis of the current situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not sensational, but rather accurate.
It is divided into three parts. The first part is part of history. It explores in depth the second part of the root cause of Pakistan's intellectual crisis and draws the author's views on the possible ways to solve the problem in the region. People have not seen the reason that Pakistan will usually be threatened by India to become a safe country. Instead, the authors focus on the internal dynamics of Pakistani politics, the weaknesses of its political system, the role of its military elite and the subsequent Afghan jihad as the cause of this development. Although India played a role in this development, it was not considered to be the only factor in this decline. He specifically mentioned the role played by the Pakistani dictator General Zia ul Haq in the fierce radicalization of Pakistani society in the 1980s. General Zia introduced the harsh Hudood law in Pakistan and supported the beliefs and political expediency of religious organizations, including militant organizations. In particular, Americans and Saudis support this phenomenon against the actions of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The follow-up policies of Kashmir and Afghanistan in the 1990s were decided by the Pakistani army and only exacerbated the situation. The Taliban and Al Qaeda are the products of this beneficial environment.
In the second part, the authors focus on the ideological disorder that is prevalent in Pakistan's extremist nature and its possible responses. The author reviews the origins of the armed forces, starting with the wings of the religious factions of the Pakistan University campus. These costumes gained power during the dictatorship of General Qi Qi in the 1980s. National encouragement has also led to an increase in the influence of religious organizations in the military, bureaucracy and the media. A spawning network at the Religious Theological Seminary has added constituencies for religious organizations. This expanded effect led to policy chaos after 9/11, when Pakistani countries had to re-examine their policies on Afghanistan and India. For a long time, the state cannot use the war on terror as its own war. This will only make the militants who hide behind the cover of Islam more daring and oppose any action against their activities. This is the step of the government to fight the jihadist organization at the request of the Americans. The lack of political direction and the military's obsession with the flawed strategic depth doctrine will only increase delays and form a national consensus.
After a brief analysis of the interests of regional countries, peace in Afghanistan is good for all. He urged Pakistan not to interfere in the Afghan issue in any way. It should not even ask for its role in the reconciliation process, and it should only be helpful if Afghanistan explicitly requires it. Pakistan's concerns should be limited to ensuring that Afghan territory is not used for any activities against peace and stability in Pakistan. It should pay more attention to the development and progress of its people, which is open to the world, including land trade between Afghanistan and India. As he saw in the context of Pakistan, the role of the international community may be limited to providing meaningful economic assistance in market access, health and education reform. He pointed out that Saudi Arabia has a special responsibility for the de-radicalization of the Paksitani society because he believes that their charities and funds are an important factor in promoting Pakistani extremism.
He believes that Afghanistan needs some time to consolidate. The downsizing of the US military will help create a successful environment for the Afghan government's reconciliation efforts. He said that it is not an option to exclude the Taliban from the political environment. Similarly, given the country's poor economic situation, it is unrealistic for NATO to plan to raise 250,000 strong Afghan national troops. He believes that due to the loyalty to Kabul as a short-term arrangement, the quasi-autonomous regions under the influence of their respective tribes are loosely arranged.
This book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the area.
Orignal From: Conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan, extremism and resistance to modernity - from Riaz Muhammad Khan
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